1. ===========================
    
  2. Django 2.1.11 release notes
    
  3. ===========================
    
  4. 
    
  5. *August 1, 2019*
    
  6. 
    
  7. Django 2.1.11 fixes security issues in 2.1.10.
    
  8. 
    
  9. CVE-2019-14232: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator``
    
  10. ================================================================================
    
  11. 
    
  12. If ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods
    
  13. were passed the ``html=True`` argument, they were extremely slow to evaluate
    
  14. certain inputs due to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular
    
  15. expression. The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
    
  16. :tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template
    
  17. filters, which were thus vulnerable.
    
  18. 
    
  19. The regular expressions used by ``Truncator`` have been simplified in order to
    
  20. avoid potential backtracking issues. As a consequence, trailing punctuation may
    
  21. now at times be included in the truncated output.
    
  22. 
    
  23. CVE-2019-14233: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()``
    
  24. =================================================================
    
  25. 
    
  26. Due to the behavior of the underlying ``HTMLParser``,
    
  27. :func:`django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate
    
  28. certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.
    
  29. The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding
    
  30. :tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable.
    
  31. 
    
  32. ``strip_tags()`` now avoids recursive calls to ``HTMLParser`` when progress
    
  33. removing tags, but necessarily incomplete HTML entities, stops being made.
    
  34. 
    
  35. Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of
    
  36. ``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a
    
  37. ``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with
    
  38. :func:`django.utils.html.escape`.
    
  39. 
    
  40. CVE-2019-14234: SQL injection possibility in key and index lookups for ``JSONField``/``HStoreField``
    
  41. ====================================================================================================
    
  42. 
    
  43. :lookup:`Key and index lookups <jsonfield.key>` for
    
  44. ``django.contrib.postgres.fields.JSONField`` and :lookup:`key lookups
    
  45. <hstorefield.key>` for :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.HStoreField`
    
  46. were subject to SQL injection, using a suitably crafted dictionary, with
    
  47. dictionary expansion, as the ``**kwargs`` passed to ``QuerySet.filter()``.
    
  48. 
    
  49. CVE-2019-14235: Potential memory exhaustion in ``django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri()``
    
  50. =====================================================================================
    
  51. 
    
  52. If passed certain inputs, :func:`django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri` could lead
    
  53. to significant memory usage due to excessive recursion when re-percent-encoding
    
  54. invalid UTF-8 octet sequences.
    
  55. 
    
  56. ``uri_to_iri()`` now avoids recursion when re-percent-encoding invalid UTF-8
    
  57. octet sequences.